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Interest Income Tax Evasion, the EU Savings 





The Savings Directive has been celebrated as a major political break-through in coordinating 
taxation in Europe. Against this background, the present paper evaluates the real-world effects 
of this directive. The directive has left a loophole by providing grandfathering (exemption 
from withholding tax) for some securities. In this paper we compare the pre-tax returns of 
exempt bonds and comparable taxable bonds. If working around the Savings Directive is 
difficult for tax evaders in Europe, then investors should be willing to pay a premium for 
bonds that are exempt from the withholding rate. Conversely, if such a premium is absent, 
then we may conclude that the supply of existing loopholes (exempt bonds included) is large 
enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at no additional cost. The findings of our 
study are in line with this latter interpretation.  
JEL Code: H24. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the EU, coordinated action in the area of direct taxation is difficult to achieve and few 
measures have been adopted in the past. A recent exception is the "Directive on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments", more commonly known as the "Savings 
Directive" (European Community 2003/48/EC). The ultimate aim of this directive is to allow 
member states of the EU to tax interest income of resident individuals if they earn interest 
income abroad. Without cross-border coordination between states, a large portion of interest 
income earned abroad may be concealed by taxpayers and the taxation of interest becomes 
highly incomplete.  
  Against this background, the agreement on the Savings Directive has been celebrated 
as a major breakthrough.
1 As of 1
st July 2005, the directive requires a member state A to 
electronically report to the country of residence B when an individual resident in B is paid 
interest income by a bank in A. An exception applies for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
For a (potentially indefinite) intermediate period, these member states are exempt from 
providing information exchange, unless the foreign investor consents. Instead, these countries 
have to levy a withholding tax on interest income paid to residents in other member states, 
75% of which has to be forwarded to the relevant countries of residence, but without revealing 
the identity of the interest recipient. This agreement became effective only after equivalent 
arrangements have been negotiated with third countries (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San 
Marino, and Switzerland) and overseas and associated territories, like the British Virgin 
Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, and the Netherlands 
Antilles. From 1
st July 2005, the relevant withholding rate is 15%. The directive 2003/48/EC 
(as revised by 2004/587/EC) provides for an increase to 20% in mid-2008 and to 35% in mid-
2011.  
 
1 See, e.g., Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007, p. 51).     2
                                                
  An important question is whether the Savings Directive is only a political symbol and 
fig leaf or whether it has real world implications for the amount of taxable interest income 
evaded. Doubts about the effectiveness of the directive may arise since several loopholes 
obviously exist. For example, the Savings Directive applies to a narrow definition of interest 
income only. Most returns from investment funds are exempt, as are dividends on shares, 
income from life insurances, and derivatives. Further, despite remarkable success in striking 
agreements, the list of third countries that have cooperated with the EU in striking comparable 
agreements is certainly incomplete and a considerable number of non-European tax havens are 
still available for tax evasion.
2 Eventually, even within Europe withholding taxes only apply 
to interest paid to private individuals, so the use of legal intermediate entities, as for example 
the Liechtenstein family foundations, which recently have received quite some attention, free 
banks from the obligation of applying the withholding tax.  
  So far, there is only limited evidence about the effectiveness of the Savings Directive. 
In 2006, Germany for example has received a total of €144.5m in forwarded withholding 
taxes from cooperating countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and several non-EU 
countries) and the information provided on cross-border interest income by Germans covers 
some €1.5bn.
3 At the same time, it is unclear to what extent these figures indicate a reduction 
in interest income evasion. The reported income may simply refer to the portion of interest 
income that would have been filed by honest taxpayers even in the absence of the information 
exchange and similarly, the withholding taxes may apply to interest income that is reported in 
Germany, and where taxpayers take out a tax credit for withholding taxes paid abroad.  
  In this paper we study the availability of loopholes by measuring the cost that 
taxpayers are willing to incur to take advantage of a particular loophole provided by the 
savings directive. According to Article 15 of the directive, negotiable bonds that have been 
issued before 1
st March 2001 are exempt from the withholding tax as long as Austria, Belgium 
 
2 At the time of writing, talks with Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao have already been initiated. A detailed 
discussion on possible limitations of the directive provides the Expert Group on the Taxation of Savings (2007).  
3 Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007).   3
                                                
and Luxembourg use withholding taxes instead of providing information exchange.
4 The 
preamble of the directive justifies this exception by the objective to avoid possible "market 
disruptions." This "grandfathering" of older bonds makes these securities the preferred choice 
for tax dodgers: in the absence of further taxation in the country of residence, these investors 
will prefer the bonds that are exempt from the withholding rates over bonds that are taxed or 
bonds that are deposited at banks in countries that provide information exchange.  
The present paper investigates whether the securities that qualify for this 
grandfathering rule have experienced a decrease in pre-tax return that may reflect the 
additional demand of tax evaders. If other loopholes are costly, then dishonest taxpayers will 
be willing to accept a lower before tax return on grandfathered securities that allow avoidance 
of the withholding tax rate compared to securities that are subject to the withholding tax. 
Whether dishonest taxpayers who consider shifting towards grandfathered bonds indeed have 
to accept a gross return that falls short of bonds that do not qualify for grandfathering of 
course depends also on the magnitudes of supply and demand for the tax-favored bonds. In 
any case, absence of tax effects for the differential returns on grandfathered and non-
grandfathered bonds should suggest that existing loopholes are wide enough to render the 
current version of the Savings Directive ineffective.  
While there has been an extensive discussion of the Savings Directive among public 
finance economists, the question put forward in the present paper has to the best of our 
knowledge not been addresses in the literature. Previous discussions of the Savings Directive 
have focused on the question of whether it is better to have information exchange or a 
withholding tax (Huizinga and Nielsen 2003) and have discussed under what conditions 
voluntary information exchange may result (Eggert and Kolmar 2002).  
The present paper is partly inspired by the studies that analyze the return differential of 
tax exempt municipal bonds and taxable state and federal bonds in the U.S. (see for examples 
 
4 The exemption is limited to interest income before 31
st December 2010. Another qualification for exemption 
from the withholding tax is that there were no further issues of the same security after 1
st March 2002 (Article 
15(1), 2003/48/EC).     4
Grinblatt and Titman 2002, Poterba 1989, and Gordon and Malkiel 1981). Due to the fact that 
the returns of municipal bonds are not subject to tax for US investors, the return of these 
bonds is empirically found to be smaller than the before tax return of other securities. In the 
present case, the tax effects may be less pronounced as bonds that fall under the 
grandfathering rule create a tax benefit to an arguably smaller group of taxpayers, those that 
are tax dodgers. Unlike in the U.S. case, institutional investors are not affected as the 
withholding tax (and the information exchange) is limited to the case of personal investors. 
Essentially, the question of whether the withholding tax is relevant for asset returns is 
therefore an empirical question. 
II. The Data Set 
In collecting our data set we started by considering a huge set of interest bearing securities 
that have been in circulation in mid-2007. The data set we started with contains all negotiable 
securities (in total 6,013) that at this date could be ordered via publicly owned banks 
(Sparkassen) in Germany. This compares to a total of 18,387 securities that were traded in 
Germany according to Deutsche Börse (2006). Among the 6,013 securities in our data set we 
identified 1,006 grandfathered bonds denominated in euro. In a next step we constructed pairs 
of twin bonds that ideally differ only in the fact that one part of each pair is grandfathered 
(i.e., not subject to the 15% withholding tax rate that according to the Savings Directive must 
be retained by Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg), while the other is not. While this 
necessarily implies that one part of each pair was issued earlier than the other one to receive 
preferential treatment under the grandfathering rule, we made sure that other characteristics of 
the pairs are comparable. In particular, we imposed the following restrictions. (i) Each pair 
must have been issued by the same institution or firm. (ii) To involve the same risk 
characteristics, both securities had to be denominated in the same currency. We decided to 
restrict our sample to pairs of twins issued in euro as this is the denomination European tax 
dodgers should have a preference for. (iii) To avoid comparisons of securities with stark diverging time horizons, difference in the remaining time to maturity (as of July 1
st, 2007) was 
not allowed to exceed one year. (iv) Return information on both twins had to be available for 
at least two quarters prior to the introduction of the withholding rate. (v) Finally, price and 
return information for all twins had to be available from the Thompson Financial data base. A 
complete list of the securities in our sample is provided in the Appendix.  
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Annotation: The figure reports the difference in maturities. A negative difference implies that the remaining 
maturity of the grandfathered bond is longer.  
 
These restrictions produced a set of 70 twins with 1,246 pairs of quarterly return 
information. Since securities that qualify for grandfathering are issued prior to March 2001 
and we imposed the restriction of similar maturity, we are dependent on issuers who 
subsequent to the issue of a grandfathered bond have also given out a comparable bond with 
shorter maturity.  
Figure 1 reports the differences in the maturity within twins, by counting the days that 
the maturity of the grandfathered bond exceeds the maturity of the twin. As can be seen, most 
differences in maturities lie in a 50 days band and the distribution is rather symmetric. This 
  5  6
suggests that any yield curve effects, which may produce a systematic higher or lower yield 
for securities with a longer maturity, should not systematically influence the return difference 
among our pairs of twins. 
III. Evidence on Return Differences 
As mentioned in the introduction, if tax evaders happen to be the marginal traders of 
securities, then we would expect that tax exempt securities trade at a premium and pay a lower 
pre-tax return. More formally, let r
gf be the pre-tax return of a grandfathered bond and r
tw the 
return of its taxable twin. Then we would expect that a trader who cannot escape the 
withholding tax t, but can evade other taxes is indifferent if 
 
(1) (1  –  t) r
tw = r
gf, or  r
tw = r
gf / (1 – t) .  
 
With a withholding rate of 15% we would have that the return of the taxable twin could be 
17.6% = [1/(1  –  15%)]  –  1 higher than that of the grandfathered bond. Clearly, forward 
looking investors will not only consider the actual withholding tax, but will anticipate future 
taxes, leading to possible tax capitalization effects well ahead of the actual introduction. This 
calls for an account of the path that led to the directive and the grandfathering rule.  
The first concrete proposals towards a withholding tax on cross-border interest in 
Europe was formulated in 1989 in Commission proposal COM (89) 60 final, which suggested 
a minimum withholding rate of 15%, but without mentioning of grandfathering. Upon strong 
concerns about capital flight, the proposal was withdrawn in favor of COM (98) 295 final of 
4
th June 1998. This revised proposal provided for a choice for member states to either 
introduce a withholding tax of 20% on cross-border interest paid to private individuals, or to 
introduce a system of information exchange with other member states. Again, the proposal 
contained no grandfathering rule for specific securities. In a next step the Commission 
formulated COM(2001) 400 final of 18
th July 2001, based on a basic agreement of the Council   7
                                                
of November 2000. It favored the system of information exchange but allowed Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg a transition period of seven years during which they would not 
participate in information exchange but levy a withholding tax on interest. This revised 
proposal introduced the idea of grandfathering (i.e., exempting from withholding tax) 
securities issued before 1
st March 2001. In the aftermath of this proposal, the introduction of 
the withholding tax stayed very uncertain, as negotiations in the Council made clear that 
cooperation by third-countries outside the EU was crucial to buy the consent of several 
member states.
5 The legislated directive of 3
rd June 2003 (Council Directive 2003/48/EC) 
introduced 1
st January 2005 as the date for the withholding tax of 15%, but had the same 
proviso as the previous proposal: without ratification of similar agreements with Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra the introduction of the withholding tax in 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg was not in sight. In principle, the same proviso continued 
to hold after directive 2004/587/EC had pushed back the introduction of the withholding tax 
to 1
st July 2005, but in a press release of 19
th July 2004 the Commission announced that an 
agreement with the required third-countries has been reached on all matters of substance.  
  From this historical account it is not entirely clear at what time the markets, if at all, 
should have priced in a differential between grandfathered and non-grandfathered bonds. In 
any case, if tax dishonest investors are marginal, then arbitrage considerations suggest that at 
least after July 2005 the pre-tax return of grandfathered bonds should have fallen below that 
of comparable other bonds.  
Table 1 and Figure 2 give summary information on the empirical yield differences in 
our sample. As reported in Table 1, the overall mean return of grandfathered bonds, measured 
by the redemption yield, in our sample was 3.698%.
6 The mean yield for the twin securities 
was only 2.5 basis points lower and the difference between yields did not change for the 
returns from July 2005 onwards, when the Savings Directive was fully effective. Figure 2 
 
5 See Rehm (2003) for a detailed account of the history of the Savings Directive.  
6 Based on the security price in the respective quarter, the redemption yield calculates the return of an investor 
who buys the security and holds it until maturity.    8
gives a more detailed picture over time by plotting the mean, the median, the 25
th centile and 
the 75
th centile for the return difference between the twin and the grandfathered bond. The 
number of pairs that enter in the calculation at each quarter is plotted against the right hand 
scale. A positive difference implies that the return was lower for the grandfathered security. 
Such a lower pre-tax return for the grandfathered security would be commensurate with a 
preference of investors for the tax advantage granted by the Savings Directive. However, if 
anything, the figure suggests that the difference in returns has decreased over time, which is 
the contrary of what we would expect when tax dodgers were the marginal investors driving 
the price differential between grandfathered and non-grandfathered bonds. The overall levels 
of return do not provide any evidence for capital market effects of the Savings Directive.  
  Something that has increased over time is the variation in the return spread as 
illustrated by Figure 3. While the standard deviation in the return spread was 6 basis points for 
the period July 2001 through July 2003, it increased to 16 basis points for the period October 
2003 through October 2007 and the increase is statistically significant. This seems to suggest 
that the legislation of the Savings Directive may have led to increased trade and thereby to an 
increased volatility in the return differences between grandfathered and non-grandfathered 
bonds. The increase in the standard deviation jumped up shortly after legislation of the 
Council Directive 2003/48/EC in summer 2003. In the following econometric analysis we will 
more closely look at whether there are systematic differences in the relative return of 
grandfathered securities and their respective twins before June 2003 and thereafter by 
essentially applying a difference in difference approach. But rather than using the difference 
in returns for pairs of twins as the left hand variable, we use the ratio of returns, which reflects 
equation (1) above.  
 Table 1: Summary returns statistics for 70 pairs in percent 
Variable Obser-
vations 
mean median  min  max 
quarterly return, grandfathered bonds  1246  3.698  3.742  2.121  10.093 
quarterly return, taxable twin  1246  3.663  3.699  1.903  10.073 
r
tw / r
gf   1246 0.991  0.998 0.583 1.395 
return, grandfathered bonds, post II/05  700  3.763  3.859  2.121  5.066 
quarterly return, taxable twin, post II/05  700  3.730  3.826  1.903  5.077 
r
tw / r
gf, post II/05  700  0.992  0.998 0.583 1.395 
Annotation: The table reports the summary statistics on quarterly data of the redemption yield, which equals the 
internal rate of return if a bond is purchased at the going price and all future cash flows are taken into account.  









































Annotation: For each pair of twins, the variable diff is defined as the pre-tax return (redemption yield) of the 
non-grandfathered security minus the pre-tax return of the grandfathered security. These differences in returns 
are plotted against the left scale for the 25
th centile, the median, the mean, and the 75
th centile for each quarter. 
The total number of pairs in each quarter is plotted on the right hand scale.  
 




















































Annotation: The number of twins is plotted against the left scale and the standard deviation (r_diff = r
tw / r
gf) is 
plotted on the right hand scale. 
  
For the empirical analysis we define three time windows. The dummy postII05 is marking 
return observations for July 2005 and thereafter (III/2005–IV2007). Since the announced 
withholding tax may have triggered anticipation effects we also created a dummy III03_II05 
for quarterly observations between July 2003 (III/2003) and June 2005 (II/2005). The base 
periods, for which we presume that there was no anticipation of the withholding tax, are 
quarters before July 2003, i.e. III/2001 through II/2003.  
Column (1) reports results from a simple OLS. While both time dummies for the post 
legislation periods are significant, they both have the wrong sign and are small in economic 
terms. The results are very similar in column (2), which reports results that have been derived 
by using fixed effects for each pair of twins. In both cases, the error terms show a high degree 
of serial correlation. Therefore, columns (3)–(7) report regressions with inclusion of two lags 
of the dependent variable.
7 Inclusion of two lagged dependent variables makes the estimated 
                                                 
7 While lagged dependent variables call for instrumental variable approaches, under rather mild assumptions, the 
bias in the estimates tends to be small with a long time horizon (see Green 2003). Arellano-Bond-type estimators 
have not been used because of the insufficient time variation of the exogenous variables, i.e. the dummies for the 
time windows.  
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effect of the time window dummies smaller and insignificant. At the same time, it resolves the 
problem of first order autocorrelation in the errors. We also tried to include a third lag of the 
endogenous variable, but found this third lag to be insignificant. When we include lagged 
endogenous variables the F-test also allows to drop the dummies for each pair. The last three 
regressions therefore drop these dummies and we also use the acceptable restriction that the 
coefficients for III03_II05 and post_II05 are the same. Equations (5)–(7) use the dummy 
post_II03, which takes on the value one for observations from July 2003. Equation (6) tests 
whether the return ratio reacts differently for pairs of twins, depending on whether the 
emission volume of the grandfathered security is small compared to its taxable twin. If tax 
evaders are indeed looking for perfect substitutes of taxable securities, then the price reaction 
may be more pronounced if the supply of grandfathered bonds is small. The relevant variable 
is constructed as Volume*d03= (Total emission of grandfathered bond in euro/total emission 
of taxable bond in euro)*post_II03. If after legislation of the directive, tax evaders demanded 
close substitutes, then we should expect that the estimated coefficient of Volume*d03 is 
negative. As reported in equation (6), there is no support for this. Finally, as Figure 2 has 
shown that our endogenous variable shows some outliers with extreme values up to 1.395 and 
as low as 0.583, we also tested a robust estimation. Equation (7) reports the results derived by 
using least absolute values (LAV), a robust regression method which minimizes the sum of 
the absolute values of the residuals. This method estimates the effects of the explanatory 
variables on the conditional median of the dependent variable rather than the conditional 
mean. The results confirm the OLS results and suggest no capital market reactions to the 
Savings Directive.  
Taken together, neither the observed return differences of taxable vs. exempt bonds as 
reported in Table 1, nor the difference in difference estimates reported in Table 2 are 
commensurate with an effect of the Savings Directive on bond returns.    12
  
Table 2: Estimation results 
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Fixed  effects  no yes  no  yes  no  no no 





(0.17) (0.39)  (0.86)  (0.72) ---  ---  --- 
Observations  1246 1246  1106  1106 1106  1106 1106 
R2/pseudoR2  0.5%  54%  72%  74% 72%  72% 49% 
Annotation: Endogenous variable: r_diff = r
tw / r
gf. P-values in brackets are calculated from robust standard 
errors in the case of OLS regressions, from bootstrap standard errors with 200 repetitions in the case of LAV. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
   13
 
IV. Conclusions 
The Savings Directive has been celebrated as a major break-through in coordinating taxation 
in Europe. Against this background, the present paper evaluated the real-world effects of this 
directive. The directive has left one explicit loophole by providing grandfathering (exemption 
from withholding tax) for some securities. In this paper we have compared the pre-tax returns 
of these exempt bonds and comparable taxable bonds. If working around the Savings 
Directive is difficult for tax evaders in Europe, then investors should be willing to pay a 
premium for bonds that are exempt from the withholding rate. Conversely, if such a premium 
is absent, then we may conclude that the supply of existing loopholes (exempt bonds 
included) is large enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at negligible additional 
cost. The findings of our study are in line with this latter interpretation. This suggests that, at 
least so far, the Savings Directive is only a minor hassle for European savers looking for ways 
to work around interest income taxation. This stands in striking contrast to the considerable 
bureaucratic and political efforts that have been exerted to introduce the measures taken. As a 
caveat, it should be noted that grandfathering will end at December 31
st, 2010.  At least, this 
will close the loophole that has acted as a litmus test in the present study.    14
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ES0413211006 ES0413211063  Argentina  Bank  1-Oct-09  3-Dec-09
DE0002298502 DE0005517700  Germany  Bank  8-Aug-08  11-Jun-08
DE0002131042 DE0001614584  Germany  Bank  2-Jun-10  18-Jun-10
BE0000262684 BE0000298076  Belgium  Government  24-Dec-12  28-Sep-12
BE0000268749 BE0000302118  Belgium  Government  29-Jul-08  28-Sep-08
BE0000282880 BE0000306150  Belgium  Government 28-Mar-15  28-Sep-15
DE0002278058 DE0002278538  Germany  Bank  16-Oct-08  20-Nov-08
DE0001240042 DE0001240174  Germany  Government  28-May-10  2-Jun-10
DE0001240059 DE0001240166  Germany  Government 16-Mar-09  10-Feb-09
DE0001240075 DE0001240182  Germany  Government 24-Jan-11 7-Sep-11
DE0001135168 DE0001135184  Germany  Government 4-Jan-11  4-Jul-11
XS0118237188 XS0168860509  USA Bank  1-Oct-10  21-May-10
DE0002330677 DE0002738218  Germany  Bank  7-Apr-09  1-Dec-09
DE0002330826 DE0003257135  Germany  Bank  30-Apr-08  1-Apr-08
DE0002330842 DE0003118121  Germany  Bank  12-Mar-10  19-Mar-10
DE0002738200 DE0002738226  Germany  Bank  1-Feb-11  6-Jun-11
DE0002474798 DE000A0A2788  Germany  Bank  4-Mar-09  8-Sep-09
DE0002321155 DE0001196442  Germany  Bank  19-Jun-08  17-Sep-08
DE0002596384 DE000A0DRUN7  Germany  Bank  5-Aug-08  18-Aug-08
FR0000570780 FR0000188690  France  Government  26-Dec-12  25-Oct-12
XS0118728756 XS0173290148  USA Bank  6-Oct-10  4-Aug-10
XS0124047431 XS0156924051  UK  Bank  5-Feb-13  29-Oct-12
DE0001381531 DE0001381770  Germany  Government 4-Jan-11  10-Jun-11
XS0098738056 XS0147372949  UK  Bank  24-Jun-09  5-May-09
DE0002574142 DE0001697134  Germany  Bank  11-Aug-08  26-Sep-08
DE0002574027 DE000HBE0BQ8  Germany  Bank  22-Jan-08  11-Mar-08
DE0002574241 DE000HBE0BA2  Germany  Bank  19-Jan-09  27-Feb-09
IT0001224309 IT0003804850  Italy  Government 1-May-08 1-Feb-08
IT0001273363 IT0003652077  Italy  Government  1-May-09  15-Apr-09
IT0001448619 IT0003799597  Italy  Government  1-Nov-10  15-Jan-10
DE0002760790 DE0002760915  Germany  Bank  17-Jun-13  4-Jul-13
DE0005881635 DE0001609097  Germany  Bank  18-Oct-07  16-Oct-07
DE0007550857 DE0007627044  Germany  Bank  12-Nov-07  12-Nov-07
DE0003412987 DE0001261386  Germany  Bank  11-Dec-07  15-Dec-07
DE0003036380 DE000A0A3RC8  Germany  Bank  7-Jan-08  17-Dec-07
DE0003892477 DE0003116497  Germany  Bank  14-Jan-08  14-Jan-08
DE0003458998 DE0008087933  Germany  Bank  13-Feb-08  4-Feb-08
DE0003454815 DE000LBW1NL4  Germany  Bank  21-Apr-08  29-Apr-08
DE0003454971 DE0003250882  Germany  Bank  13-May-08  8-May-08
DE0001237758 DE0007153017  Germany  Bank  15-Sep-08  5-Sep-08
DE0003036091 DE0001474351  Germany  Bank  27-Nov-08  28-Nov-08
DE0003035945 DE0002912292  Germany  Bank  27-Nov-08  15-Dec-08
DE0003036604 DE0007627093  Germany  Bank  15-Dec-08  15-Dec-08
DE0001023927 DE0001618809  Germany  Bank  9-Jan-09  21-Jan-09  16
 
DE0003037214 DE0006943582  Germany  Bank  4-Mar-09  30-Jan-09
DE0003517132 DE000LBW1PS4  Germany  Bank  14-May-09  3-Jun-09
DE0003519922 DE0007627051  Germany  Bank  4-Dec-09  14-Dec-09
DE0001162691 DE0007935769  Germany  Bank  21-Jan-10  22-Jan-10
DE0001023810 DE0007266793  Germany  Bank  6-Jul-10  30-Jul-10
DE0006276306 DE000A0A24C6  Germany  Bank  14-Feb-11  10-Mar-11
DE0002268778 DE0001663656  Germany  Bank  30-Oct-08  1-Sep-08
DE0002984622 DE0002984895  Germany  Bank  2-Oct-08  7-Jul-08
DE0002985884 DE0002983194  Germany  Bank  6-Oct-08  3-Mar-08
DE0002987575 DE0002983301  Germany  Bank  1-Jul-08  17-Jan-08
DE0002989563 DE0003115689  Germany  Bank  16-May-08  23-May-08
DE0002989753 DE0007266264  Germany  Bank  1-Sep-08  28-Feb-08
DE0002674686 DE0007691503  Germany  Bank  26-Nov-08  22-Dec-08
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